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The working-age population in Germany is projected 
to initially age and to shrink continually over the next 
30 years. The decline is expected to be around 11% 
between 2018 and 2050 (see Fig. 1). This will attenuate 
the country’s overall economic productivity and will 
have considerable consequences for its overall eco-
nomic development. This overview shows how demo-
graphic aging (the scenario “projected population”) in 
Germany until 2050 will affect key macroeconomic in-
dicators, compared to a scenario in which the popula-
tion remains constant at the level of 2018 (the base-
line “constant population (2018)”). 
The negative effects of demographic aging are ex-
pected to attenuate the growth of labor productivity 
until 2050. The difference between the scenario “pro-
jected population” and the baseline scenario should 
increase from around 0,8 euros per hour worked in 
2030 to 1,1 euros in 2040 and to almost 1,9 euros in 
2050 (in 2010 prices) (see Fig. 2).  
The growth of the real gross domestic product (GDP) 
ought to be significantly attenuated by demographic 
aging in the next few decades (see Fig. 3). In compar-
ison to the baseline scenario, the increase is expected 
to be 2.6% lower in 2030, 6.7% lower in 2040 and 
10.7% lower in 2050. In absolute terms, demographic 
aging and its negative effects are expected to attenu-
ate GDP by 274 billion euros in 2040 and by 507 bil-
lion euros in 2050 (in 2010 prices). 
With respect to real GDP per capita, which is in effect 
the average material prosperity per inhabitant, this is 
expected to result in the following: In 2030 GDP per 
capita will amount to around 1,600 euros lower than if 
the demographic aging of the coming decades had 
not taken place. In 2040 it will be lower by around 
3,700 euros and in 2050 by about 6,000 euros (in 
2010 prices) (see Fig. 4). 
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Figure 1  Historic and expected development of working-age 
                population (aged between 15-64 years), 1980- 2100 
Quelle: UNO - Department of Economic and social Affairs, Eurostat database. 
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FIGURE 2  Productivity per hour worked  
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 3  Potential output 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 4  Potential output per capita 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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In the baseline scenario, the savings rate remains vir-
tually unchanged until 2050 (see Fig. 5). Demographic 
aging will bring about a sharp rise in the number of 
people of retirement age and a simultaneous decline in 
the working-age population. This will lead to a signifi-
cant decline in the savings rate in the coming decades. 
The drop is expected to amount to nearly 3 percent-
age points (or 10%) between 2018 and 2040 or 2050, 
respectively. In the years 2040 and 2050, the savings 
rate will therefore be expected to amount to about 2.4 
percentage points (or about 8.5%) lower than it would 
be without demographic aging.  
This will also reduce the supply of domestic capital and 
thus the scope for domestic investment (see Fig. 6). 
In 2040, the investment rate is expected to be about 
1,4% lower than in the baseline scenario. However, in 
an open economy, the domestic capital supply can be 
supplemented by capital inflows from abroad. 
The simulation calculations also confirm the theoretical 
assumption of rising inflationary pressure due to demo-
graphic aging (see Fig. 7). In 2040, the inflation rate 
in the scenario “projected population” is expected to 
be almost 1 percentage point higher than in the base-
line scenario, and the same applies in 2050.  
The declining savings rate and a simultaneously rising 
consumption rate, due to the growing share of pen-
sioners, are in turn expected to lead to an increase in 
domestic consumption. This means that fewer goods 
and services will be available for export. The rising 
price level, due to the growing inflation rate, in turn 
means that foreign demand for domestic goods tends 
to decline. Fig. 8 reflects the decline of the current ac-
count surplus in Germany due to aging. It is projected 
to decline from about 7% of GDP to nearly 5% of the 
GDP between 2018 and 2040 and to 3.4% of GDP by 
2050. Nevertheless, the current account balance is 
expected to remain positive.  
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FIGURE 5  Gross domestic saving 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 6  Gross fixed capital formation 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 7  Consumer price inflation rate 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 8  Current account balance 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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